ABSTRACT With the destructiveness of modern conflict, varied national and international calls have been made to constrain the employment of weaponry. Efforts to establish prohibition regimes attempt to cut through disorderly and diverse sociotechnical assemblages to locate the principal source of a problem in order to justify a certain course of action. Science and Technology Studies cautions against separating elements of socio-technical assemblages. Likewise, the fragility and contestability of particular determinations of the acceptability of weaponry are apparent in contemporary prohibition debates. Even while many acknowledge the problems of definitely locating some source of acceptability, many arms-control discussions invariably entail efforts to do just that. This paper considers the dynamics of the claims and counterclaims offered to support contentions about the acceptability of the employment of weaponry and thereby justify certain control regimes. As argued, when faced with fundamental difficulties and dilemmas associated with offering determinations of where unacceptability rests, actors engage in various strategies to deny, defer, deter and deflect having to resolve the complicated issues at stake. Alternative characterizations and definitions involve alternative ways of shifting the burden of proof for resolving intractable problems. The paper proposes the notion of 'disposal strategies' as a useful way of characterizing the processes of ordering, whereby actors attempt to manage persistent problems and dilemmas.
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Throughout history, technology has been implicated in killing and injuring. Perhaps as in no other area, weaponry makes explicit the potential for innovations to serve destructive ends. With the development of new forms of weaponry have come attempts to deem certain uses of force as unacceptable. There are pressing issues about just how such evaluations can be justified. What is at stake is how to cut through a heterogeneous world in order to offer a characterization of just what is taking place and (crucially) why. Commenting on the general ability of weapons to lead to unacceptable outcomes requires abstracting beyond particular instances by grouping various 'objects' or 'events' together across time in order to grasp what is common between them.
Analyses from Science and Technology Studies (STS) counsel against attempts to derive general evaluations of technology (for example, Grint & Woolgar, 1997; Latour, 1999) . Doubts centre on how any such scheme can respond to the multiple contexts, usages, and ways of understanding what is taking place. Establishing a credible characterization of the acceptability of a technology is inextricably bound up with specifying essences, that is, settling just what it really is, what it is for, and what it does. The continuing eschewal of determinist and essentialist theories in STS leaves little room for abstracted claims. However variously conceived and configured in STS, the importance given to users and contexts in the operation of devices suggests numerous complications, if not downright impossibilities, for establishing credible determinations about the invariant qualities of technologies, be they weapons or anything else.
While actors and analysts alike may recognize the pervasive and perennial problems with attributing definite characteristics to varied objects and acts, attempts to devise prohibitions regularly entail delineating certain actions or artefacts as inappropriate, unacceptable, and so forth. In doing so, efforts to establish workable and legitimate standards must find ways to address a range of persistent and ineradicable problems regarding the relationship between humans and technology, the categorization of related but also dissimilar phenomena and the ethics of developing and modifying lethal weapons. This paper seeks to establish which strategies are employed in arguments and counter-arguments for weapons-related prohibitions and to explain how those strategies attempt to respond to varied ethical and epistemic dilemmas.
As argued, when faced with questions that have no final principled resolution, actors devise ways to dispose of the need to reach such resolution. This paper, then, is about attempts to secure evaluations of the acceptability of the use of weaponry so as to justify certain control measures. It also is about the crafting of evaluations so as to negotiate the dilemmas associated with specifying the acceptability of weaponry. More programmatically, given the resistance to resolution of dilemmas associated with evaluating controversial technologies, this paper suggests a path for future research. That path has to do with attending to what is accomplished 1 in and through the management and distribution of dilemmas. The notion of 'disposal strategies' is offered as a way of characterizing the processes of social ordering whereby actors attempt to handle persistent problems associated with the legitimacy of their accounts. In considering these issues, the paper extends earlier work, by the author and by others, that considers how determinations of responsibility are made in relation to controversial technologies (Wynne, 1998; Rappert, 2001) .
Controversy is rarely far removed from the use of force, especially when it results in serious injury or death. To set up this analysis, the paper further expands on these points by referring to disagreements over the use of weaponry. Participants in such disputes attempt to define and discriminate 'social' and 'technical' factors in some credible fashion in order to suggest the principal source for concern. Prospective and retrospective attempts to adjudicate acceptability in order to justify particular prohibition regimes are then surveyed. In the abstract, it might appear that setting out criteria to provide a basis for prohibitions would be fairly straightforward, but in arms-control deliberations both the criteria that are deemed pertinent and the determination of what they mean in practice are matters of interpretation and negotiation. This survey of a diverse range of prohibition efforts provides the basis for analysing the appraisal of weaponsrelated activities later on. This analysis begins with some further observations about the contested and dilemmatic aspects of the cases considered. Significant and recurring dilemmas that arise in debates about prohibitions are identified. The strategies employed to manage the difficulties associated with making determinations are then discussed. If attempts to 'name' the problem associated with the employment of weaponry are always potentially open to challenge, then the processes by which determinations are made are of some importance.
Contention, Comparison and Commentary
The application of military force is often a matter of controversy. What one individual deems a just exertion of force, another labels as unwarranted violence. There is no unanimity about what distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate force. Many national and international laws require organizations with official authority -such as the police and military -to exercise force, but to apply only an amount proportional to the threat faced. What such general prescriptions mean for particular cases, though, is far from clear-cut. Charges of 'abusive', 'excessive' or 'unnecessary' force typically stem from alternative administrative, professional, legal and other standards (Adams, 1999) .
Employing technology does not necessarily help to reduce disagreement about acceptability. When officers don protective riot control equipment to 'maintain order' at protests, when populations subject to international peace-keeping operations routinely carry machetes for 'self-protection' or when one nation decides to invest billions of dollars for an inter-continental missile 'defence' system, the wisdom of these acts is readily contested. Different appraisals often derive from alternative assessments of the purpose of these actions. If the means exist to selectively destroy certain targets with 'smart' precision bombs, for instance, then the failure to employ such options -as alleged in the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air attacks with cluster bombs near populated areas in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Human Rights Watch, 2000) -brings condemnation. Underlying such 'ethical' debates are pragmatic 'technical' assessments regarding the possibility of avoiding 'collateral damage' and the necessity of employing force.
The role of technology in contributing to or facilitating inappropriate acts is multiply conceived. Perhaps the most common framing of this is in terms of the use of neutral tools that can be employed for good or bad purposes, depending on the user. After suffering from the effects of cluster bombs during the Vietnam War, in 1974 a North Vietnamese official reportedly argued against an international ban on them, stating: 'A weapon used by the imperialist is an imperialist weapon . . .. In the hands of a liberation fighter, it is a sacred tool' (Prokosch, 1995: chapter 5) . To characterize weapons in this way as tools used for good or bad purposes gives a central role to the aims of users and the consequences of their actions.
However widespread the framing of weapons as 'neutral tools', the suggestion that their acceptability should be approached in terms of the (mis-)application of tools has been subject to much criticism. Abstract calls to clearly demarcate use from abuse and to refrain from the latter give little indication of the difficulties of achieving such a demarcation in practice. For instance, beginning in the late 1980s, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) deployed rubber bullets and cylinders in street clashes with Palestinians. Despite being labelled 'non-lethal' weapons, tens of deaths and hundreds of serious injuries have been attributed to these munitions. IDF spokespersons have denied widespread violations of the guidelines regarding the minimum firing distance and target placement, which are supposed to ensure that only relatively minor injuries are inflicted. Various justifications and excuses have been offered to explain casualties: the unpredictability of 'riot' situations, the difficulty of aiming and the problems of estimating target distance. While acknowledging some level of unpredictability, critics have argued that the sheer number of severe injuries and the failure to reprimand officers suspected of violating the guidelines suggest something much more systematic is at work than an unfortunate unpredictability (see B'Tselem, 1998) . One person's unintended consequence is another's predictable outcome.
A further criticism of 'neutral tool' conceptions is offered by those who argue that certain weapons -for instance, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons -are abhorrent and inhumane by their very nature (see for example, Price, 1997; Tannenwald, 1999) . Following this line of thinking, it is not the aims of the users, their competency or even their intended effects that determine the acceptability of weaponry. Instead, the very characteristics of some weapons make them categorically objectionable. For example, the employment of chemical weapons by the Iraqi military to kill more than 5000 Iraqi Kurds in Halabja during 1988 was widely cited in 2002-03 as an indicator of the treachery of Saddam Hussein's regime. In contrast, the fact that thousands of Kurds perished through conventional weapon attacks with bombs and bullets in countries such as Iraq and Turkey in recent decades 2 was not widely cited at the time as an indicator of the barbarity of these governments. For whatever reasons, chemical weapons were placed in an especially repugnant moral category.
STS authors have questioned consequentialist use/abuse framings of technology as well as categorical condemnations. In many recent STS analyses, technologies are neither treated as possessing inherent essences that dictate human behaviour irrespective of the situation in question nor as mere apolitical things to be used or abused. Calls are made to see technology 'in context' as part of socio-technical assemblages.
3 Arguably, the constructivist-related approaches so prominent today are at their best in illustrating the local contingencies at work in the operation of technology. For instance, Latour (1999: chapter 6) examines the National Rifle Association's slogan, 'Guns don't kill people, people do', as an occasion to discuss how the availability of guns might facilitate shooting deaths. As he characterizes it, debates about gun control often turn on whether the gun is deemed a neutral tool that simply gives new capabilities to pre-existing actors or whether its presence transforms action and morality. Latour criticizes both views, because asking whether it is the user or the gun that is the 'real' agent misses how the weapon and the person are hybridized together in a locally accomplished assemblage. The problems associated with separating 'the social' from 'the technical' or speaking about technology as some abstracted thing also are acknowledged outside of academic discussions. In 1999, for instance, the author participated in discussions by Amnesty International (UK) regarding whether systematic and general measures could be developed to assess the potential of technology to be abused. For many years Amnesty had raised what some staff members regarded as ad hoc concerns about the inherent feasibility of some technologies to commit human right violations. For example, devices using electricity to 'shock', 'stun' and 'torture' often leave little visible bodily evidence, which makes it difficult for forensic investigation to corroborate allegations of human right violations. In debating how to assess the 'abusability of technology', despite wishing to comment about the intrinsic characteristics of weapons, the first factor identified was the range of organizational accountability procedures (for example, rules of engagement, complaints procedures, and so on) for governing security forces.
The permeability and inter-relatedness of technology and society are readily acknowledged when questions are raised about how to prevent possible outcomes. And yet, while noting the relevance and interrelatedness of 'user', 'technology' and 'contextual' factors, agencies concerned with prohibiting weapons attempt to generalize about what needs to be done. They move beyond specific situations or group together what might otherwise be regarded as disparate objects; this even while recognizing the limitations of the claims offered. Although what was said earlier about the importance of approaching technology as part of wider assemblages might readily be conceded by many, appeals to pragmatism can be said to require finding a way to pin down the source of the problem.
Just as the need to understand technologies as part of wider systems is not an insight limited to academics debating theories of technology, so too concerns about the pragmatic import of analysis is not solely the domain of 'practitioners'. While one can unpack the many categories employed and meanings attributed to objects -say, in accounts of the relationship between the availability of handguns and murder rates -this should not stop analysts from establishing the capabilities of technology. Negotiations aside, pistols and assault rifles: have unique capabilities for tearing flesh and splintering bones when compared to other kinds of weapons, such as knives and hands. Without a gun, it is hard to tear so much flesh and splinter so much bone so rapidly and readily with such focus while standing 10 feet away from an intended victim. Today, they also have special capabilities in expediting murders, capabilities that should not be lost in endlessly iterative reinterpretations. (Kling, 1992: 345) Along similar lines, Wright & Ketcham (1990: 187-88 ) comment, in relation to the legitimacy and legality of particular lines of disputed 'defensive' bio-research (see later), that 'those who either make military policy or seek to influence it cannot afford the luxury of an academic retreat from judgment. In the military and political spheres, assessments of the significance of military research may be required long before closure on the significance of individual research projects is possible'. In sum, the acceptability of the employment of weaponry is contentious: there are multiple conceptions of just how weapons' attributes, situational factors or the identity of those involved with their use contribute to outcomes deemed unacceptable. Appeals to pragmatics, politics and purposes are at play in such disputes. Suggestions for prohibiting specific weapons and methods of force are considered in the next section in relation to the question of just how and why the uniqueness of sociotechnical assemblages might give way to the generalizations that inform prohibition regimes.
Making the 'It' and Making It Stick
Attempts have been made in connection with controversies about particular weapons to establish a basis for evaluating the likelihood of inappropriate outcomes from their use. This section examines a number of such attempts. In line with a strategy used in studies of other technologies, I shall consider a number of controversial cases that illuminate dynamics at work more widely. Owing to the degree of contention, these are cases in which the containment of information by officials and organizations has not been so absolute as to prevent analysis (Hilgartner, 2000) . The cases examined include prominent attempts to devise and implement prohibitions. The cases are aligned with the different ways of theorizing the place of technology: the intrinsic effects of weapons, the purposes they serve and the intentions of users. The indeterminacies and inadequacies associated with particular prohibitions are considered. The broad range of prohibitions covered is intended to illustrate the pervasiveness of the problems of attempting analytically to parse socio-technical assemblages so as to justify specific prohibitions.
Unacceptability as a Function of Effects
The potential for weapons to cause injury deemed unacceptable is often linked to assessments of their destructiveness. The greater the potential for harm, the more numerous the situations in which the resort to some weapon cannot be justified. International laws and treaties stipulate limits to the means of combat. Humanitarian law, for instance, prohibits causing 'unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury' to combatants. Formalized definitions for these terms, though, have never been set out. In response, members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (1997: 8) have proposed 'clear and objective' medical criteria for evaluating the effects of weaponry in the SIrUS Project ('Superfluous Injury' or 'Unnecessary Suffering'). Weapons that cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering are defined as those that inflict:
• specific disease, specific abnormal physiological state, specific abnormal psychological state, specific and permanent disability or disfigurement; • field mortality of Ͼ 25% or a hospital mortality Ͼ 5%; • grade 3 wounds as measured by the Red Cross classification (skin wounds of Ͼ 100 mm with a cavity); • effects for which there is no well-recognized and proven treatment.
These criteria have been offered as objective effect-based standards for what constitutes an abhorrent weapon.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, enthusiasm for the criteria has not been universal. In the abstract, it may readily be acknowledged as mere common sense that some weapons cause greater injury than others, but trying to define such differences in practice, for the purpose of establishing prohibitions, leads to any number of objections. Government representatives have made various criticisms about the generalizability of the SIrUS criteria (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1999). Numerous 'contextual' considerations have been said to invalidate the standards. The second and third criteria, for instance, were derived from ICRC hospital and casualty data for injuries sustained in conflicts during the past 50 years, but generally between factions in the southern hemisphere. As such, the data have been said to be unrepresentative of the effects of modern, technologically sophisticated forces. Officials from the USA have further argued that the criteria did not take into account how the quality of available medical assistance affects recovery rates. Critics also pointed out that highly discriminate force employments, such as sniper fire, would be deemed unacceptable due to their high mortality rates.
Responding to these criticisms while seeking to maintain the generalizability of any proscriptive standards would be problematic. Making allowances for particular weapons in particular contexts, or modifying the criteria by differentiating them in relation to certain factors (such as the nature of accessible medical facilities), would undermine the possibility that the criteria would serve as reasonably straightforward, practical guides. Making specific exceptions is not likely to establish agreement, but to provide the basis for further cycles of generalization and particularization. When allowances are made for certain circumstances, such as lowering or raising hospital mortality rates because of the quality of medical care, then new general standards will be established for a more circumscribed range of situations. These in turn may draw objections that highlight other circumstantial factors (say, the physical terrain) which undermine the generalizability of the already more restricted criteria. As new or modified technologies are used in varied circumstances, questions can be asked constantly about the applicability of standards. In principle there is no end to the number of factors that can be brought to bear in determining why particular injuries and deaths take place, and thus there is no end to possible exceptions for forming limited general standards relevant to particular situations.
It was partially the prospect of a similar dynamic regarding the acceptability of anti-personnel landmines that reportedly led many nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to campaign for a total ban of such technologies (Goldbalt, 1999) . For quite some time as part of the United Nations Certain Conventional Weapons Convention (colloquially called the 'Inhumane Weapons Convention'), member states debated whether restrictions should be placed on anti-personnel landmines because of their alleged indiscriminate effects. In 1983 various precautionary steps were required by member states to protect civilians against mines and boobytraps. In 1996, amid growing public concern about the destruction wrought by 'mines', further requirements were put in place stipulating standards for their detectability and longevity. Because these additional amendments to the Convention defined anti-personnel landmines as being 'primarily' designed to injure or kill, they did not prohibit mines that had not primarily been designed to inflict casualties (for example, mines that 'primarily' marked out an area in order to restrict military movements). Moreover, the unlimited deployment of so-called 'smart' deactivating mines was permissible. With such provisions, groups seeking to limit the placement of landmines would have to establish persuasive claims about their real purpose or their probable self-destruction rate (itself regarded as dependent on environmental conditions and placement practices).
The (slight) prospect of policing such restrictions led concerned NGOs and governments to go outside the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention. In 1997, the Anti-Personnel Mines (APM) Convention was agreed upon by 97 governments. It prohibits the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer of all such mines. Its passage has not resolved debate about what is acceptable. What distinguishes anti-personnel and anti-tank mines remains contentious (see Landmine Action, 2001). Moreover, countries such as China, Russia, and the USA did not sign on to the APM Convention. Instead these governments argued that mines remain highly effective and discriminate in effect if the right precautions regarding their placement and deactivation are taken. To say that landmines per se kill and maim thousands of people per year then is to misconstrue the issues at stake. Injuries to civilians are contingent on who uses which devices. Banning mines will not end conflict, but require that hostilities should be resolved by perhaps more indiscriminate means than (properly placed) anti-personnel mines (Alexander, 1999: 197) . Successive US administrations have sought to develop 'technical' solutions to the problems of landmines by actively promoting new self-detonating and non-lethal mines (German Initiative to Ban Landmines & Landmine Action, 2001 ). The APM Convention makes no allowances for potential 'humane' or appropriate uses of anti-personnel landmines in particular situations; it simply deems these weapons illegitimate.
Unacceptability as Malign Use
The example of landmine restrictions suggests that some determinations of the effects of weapons and of what controls need to be in place also require assessments of who employs them. Thus, a weapon used by a highly responsible government for just aims is a legitimate instrument. That such a weapon might fall into the 'wrong hands' and be misused is widely acknowledged in arms proliferation discussions; even if there is little agreement about whose hands are bloody. As will be examined later though, attempts to establish prohibitions on the basis of who will use the weapon and for what purpose often give way to a wider range of concerns.
In order to prevent arms transfers to individuals and governments under embargo, or otherwise judged as undesirable, major arms-exporting countries in Europe and North America have enacted export control systems that include provisions requiring companies to obtain licences for shipments of their products. In the UK before 1997, the standard practice for evaluating applications for licences -outside those few national destinations under official embargo -was to examine them on a 'case-by-case' basis. Rather than deriving a formal list of acceptable weapons for approved countries or even specifying the criteria for making decisions, successive UK governments treated each application on its individual merits. Just how decisions were taken by officials, and in relation to which concerns, was not clear outside of the corridors of Whitehall.
The inadequacy of this state of affairs was underscored by a series of scandals in the early 1990s regarding the destination of British arms and their reported role in acts of torture, civil repression and military aggression (Amnesty International, 1992; Scott, 1996) . When the Labour Party came into office in 1997 it promised to reform export controls as part of what was dubbed in the media as Britain's 'ethical foreign policy'. In July of that year, Robin Cook, British Foreign Minister at the time, announced the establishment of the National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. As part of these criteria, licences would be denied for: equipment where there is clear evidence of the recent use of similar equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. (Cook, 1997: column 27)
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With this announcement, for the first time, 'human rights' related considerations regarding the use of exports were explicitly acknowledged as elements of British licensing decisions. Just how such principles or criteria ought to affect approval decisions has been controversial. For instance, major concerns were voiced in relation to the supply of spare parts for Hawk jets to Zimbabwe. In February 2000, the Prime Minister himself reportedly pushed through seven licence applications for such parts (MacAskill, 2000) . Starting in August of 1998, Zimbabwe took part in a war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This intervention included bombing sorties with Hawk jets and alleged aerial attacks on civilians. Against Foreign Minister Cook's objection, the UK government cited the need to comply with commercial obligations in its decision to supply Hawk spare parts in 2000.
4 A Parliamentary Joint Committee set up to scrutinize exports disagreed with this decision to supply the spare parts, saying that it involved a 'serious error of judgement' (H.M. Stationery Office, 2001) . Later that year, after internal strife in Zimbabwe about the distribution of land between white and black citizens, commercial obligations cited as the ground for supplying spare parts were set aside, and no further licences were supposed to have been granted.
This case would suggest that discretion is still central to export decisions; this despite the use-related export licensing criteria. Just what is practical and feasible, just which action might count as a break with the past, and just which reasons are necessary to require such a break are not decided in advance. After adopting an ethical dimension to its foreign policy, British Labour ministers have repeatedly faced objections that their granting of certain arms sales signalled a retreat from their ethical commitments. However, detailed elaborations of how ethical considerations entered into export approvals have not been publicly elaborated. With respect to British export controls, while much policy attention has been given to the importance of denying arms to those who might use them for malign ends, just how such denials are made is less than clear.
Perhaps some of the most significant debate has taken place in relation to arms exports to Israel. During the autumn of 2000, as conflict heightened between Israelis and Palestinians, the Israeli Air Force used helicopter gun ships during attacks in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israeli officials said such technology allowed the pin-point targeting of key strategic facilities that minimized potential casualties, though this has been questioned by others (Amnesty International, 2000) .
With the overall heightening of violence in late 2000, France and Germany initiated undeclared embargoes of defence equipment to Israel (Krau, 2000) . Britain did not completely halt transfers but received an agreement from the Israeli government that: 'no UK-originated equipment . . . are used as part of the defense force's activities in the territories' (Anonymous, 2002 (White & Norton-Taylor, 2002) . For the purposes of this paper though, I want to consider it as an attempt to articulate the criteria employed to determine the appropriateness of an export. In this example it is possible to develop at least a rudimentary understanding of how export decisions are justified; in particular, how the sort of malign use considerations laid out in the National Arms Export Licensing Criteria are interpreted in relation to other concerns.
The justifications given, and the criteria or factors set out, attempt to balance various tensions. On the one hand, the HUD are an insignificant percentage of the overall value of the F-16s and thus do not significantly enable possible abuses with the fighters. On the other hand, the displays are vital because they are not easily withdrawn. The status of the HUD as both insignificant and vital is maintained by considering them in relation to different systems: the physical assemblage of the aircraft or the customercontractor relations of production agreements.
Another source of tension is that the policy statement is made on a particular occasion to justify one decision, but it states enduring principles. Yet the factors identified as stemming from the principles are indeterminate in meaning. They do not permit any transfers, nor do they pose a definitive basis for refusing any. So, when asked what counted as a 'significant' 'component' part -whether, for instance, a component that made up 10% of the total value would have been deemed more significant and thus unacceptable -the Prime Minister's Official Spokesman responded that such judgments would be taken on a 'case-by-case' basis. The 1% figure for the F-16 HUD (see Box 1) only illustrates the insignificance of the component in this particular instance (Ten Downing Street, 2002) . In the future it might not be relevant.
Given the qualifications stated and the range of possible concerns that might be brought to bear in decisions, to say that in the future 'similar' decision-making processes will take place for 'similar' applications does not resolve or necessarily clarify how any particular factor (such as the material value of the technology in question) will be handled for the purposes of export decisions. This is especially the case because such matters would be assessed in relation to the other factors outlined in Box 1. In addition, it is more than a mere possibility that the potential basis for any further proscription will be short-lived. So, when questioned as to whether the incorporation policy indicated the Israelis' promise in 2000 not to use British equipment in the Palestinian Territory had been 'torn-up', the Prime Minister's Official Spokesman indicated that this agreement 'related In recent years there have been far-reaching changes in the defence industry in the United Kingdom, the rest of Europe and the United States. Against the background of the end of the Cold War and the resulting reduction in defence budgets world wide, the defence industry has been subject to massive rationalisation. One consequence of this change is that increasingly defence goods are manufactured from components sourced in several different countries.
This restructuring of the defence industry presents new challenges for the Government's approach to export licensing. Many export licence applications are for goods which are to be incorporated in defence equipment in a second country, which thereafter may be exported to a third country.
The Consolidated EU [European Union] and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria [quoted earlier] . . . make clear that they 'will not be applied mechanistically' to decisions on export licence applications, but rather 'on a case-by-case basis, using judgment and common sense'. The criteria do not provide specific guidance on what approach should be adopted in these 'incorporation' cases … After very careful consideration, Her Majesty's Government has, therefore, decided that it is necessary to set out how it will in future approach licence applications for goods where it is understood that the goods are to be incorporated into products for onward export. The Government will continue to assess such applications on a case by case basis against the Consolidated Criteria, while at the same time having regard to, inter alia, the following factors: (a) the export control policies and effectiveness of the export control system of the incorporating country; (b) the importance of the UK's defence and security relationship with the incorporating country; (c) the materiality and significance of the UK-origin goods in relation to the goods into which they are to be incorporated, and in relation to any end-use of the finished products which might give rise to concern; (d) the ease with which the UK-origin goods, or significant parts of them, could be removed from the goods into which they are to be incorporated; and (e) the standing of the entity to which the goods are to be exported.
Against this background the Government has considered its response to a number of applications for the export of parts, subsystems and components to the USA for incorporation into equipment eventually destined for other countries. These include Head Up Display units (HUDs) for incorporation in F-16 aircraft scheduled for delivery to Israel in 2003. The UK content in F-16s is less than 1 per cent in value, but the supply of HUDs is part of a long-standing collaboration in this US programme. Any interruption to the supply of these components would have serious implications for the UK's defence relations with the United States . . . The United States Government maintains a strong and effective export licensing system . . .. Appropriate use of arms exported to Israel by the US is the subject of regular dialogue between the two countries, and when the US have concerns they make these known to the Israelis (as required by Congressional legislation). The State Department has been monitoring Israeli actions carefully and will continue to do so.
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Social Studies of Science 35/2 to a specific situation and had been written to address concerns at that particular time ' (Ten Downing Street, 2002) . Whether and how the HUD decision represented continuity or discontinuity with past practices was a topic of significant political debate. When asked whether the approval of the HUD signalled a retreat from its ethical foreign policy, a government official pointed out there had never been an 'ethical foreign policy'; rather the government phrase was an 'ethical dimension' to foreign policy. Herein human rights made up one, but just one, type of criterion. The government's principles had not altered; what had changed was the recognition of the new 'modern reality which we are confronting' (Ten Downing Street, 2002) . In the context of the farreaching changes in the defence industry and the increasing out-sourcing of production facilitates, the UK government had to adopt a special approach to cases involving incorporation for onward export. A sceptic might ask just how broadly component parts are defined: as ammunition for guns, electronics for attack helicopters or other equipment that might likewise require a 'special' approach. Following what was said earlier, the official response would have to be: 'It depends'. For critics of the HUD export, the approval represented a break with the past or business as usual, depending on the scruples attributed to previous practices of the Labour government (Adams, 2002) . In other words, debate about the approval of the HUD centred on whether the policy represented a mere redrawing of the existing policy or a fundamental shift in the essence of decisionmaking.
Unacceptability as Prohibited Purposes
Many formal stipulations of arms-control conventions identify weapons technology or its users as the proper subject for restrictions. Prohibitions have been offered that outlaw weapons altogether, place limits on how they should be used in conflict or restrict who should have access to them. As suggested earlier, spokespersons seeking to contest certain specifications of acceptability (for example, based on effects) readily do so by highlighting other pertinent issues (for example, the situation, the user) in order to support alternative appraisals. In addition, when the innovation of weaponry proceeds and alternative ways are found for producing specific effects, or when existing technology is directed to previously unimagined ends, the
BOX 1 continued
At the same time the Government carefully takes into account the importance of maintaining a strong and dynamic defence relationship with the US. This relationship is fundamental to the UK's national security as well as to our ability to play a strong and effective role in the world . . .. Taking account of all these considerations, the Government considered that the applications should be approved . . .. The Government will apply similar considerations to similar applications in future.
Rappert: Prohibitions, Weapons and Controversy 223
possibility of formulating user-, technology-or context-based criteria of acceptability has proved demanding to say the least. Partially in order to maintain flexible interpretations, while also setting out a broad restriction, both the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention employ the so-called General Purpose Criterion. Article I of the BTWC states:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce or stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.
In other words, the prohibition embodied in the BTWC is not against biological weapons per se. Instead, it is a general restriction of certain purposes served by science and technology.
In terms of policing adherence to the BTWC, the open-ended nature of this prohibition is at once both its strength and its weakness. The General Purpose Criterion has the strength of being flexible enough to accommodate new technologies and it also does not seek to limit the use of biological agents for benign medical purposes. However, it also has the major weakness of failing to elaborate just what is and is not permissible. The Convention draws on a number of terms, such as 'development', 'acquire', 'prophylactic' and 'protective'. After the inception of the BTWC, the meaning of such terms became contentious in the way they relate to determinations of the permissibility of particular activities. In this section, I consider only one aspect of this: which activities under the heading of 'biodefence' are permissible for 'prophylactic and protective purposes'. The BTWC allows governments to undertake activities intended to prevent and counter a bioattack, such as the production of vaccines and treatments. However, just how intentions can be attributed to sociotechnical activities is not straightforward.
A major source of disagreement has been the matter of what, if anything, distinguishes the knowledge and techniques necessary for such protective steps and what is required for the production of biological weapons. In general terms, offensive and defensive programmes require similar knowledge about the mechanisms of pathogenic agents, the response of the immune system to those agents, and the means of dispersing them. Thus research and development (R&D) undertaken in universities or industry can inadvertently serve the development of weapons. Even from within biodefence establishments, there has been an acknowledgement that biodefence might unintentionally further ends that it was designed to prevent (Zilinskas, 1992) . Along these lines, the efforts by some countries to develop extensive protective measures for their troops and populations against bioweapons can be taken by others as a prelude to their use.
Pressing questions consequently arise of how to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable weapons activities. David Huxsoll (1992) of the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases suggested that while some similarities exist between vaccine and weapons development, there were also differences that enabled individual projects (such as those carried out by the US Army) to be evaluated. Both vaccine and weapon applications isolate viruses, determine their biochemical properties and culture them. Subsequently, however, the required activities begin to diverge, particularly in relation to the quantities used. Despite the stated aim by US officials to set clear guidelines for assessing its own programme, a very different approach has been taken in evaluating other national biodefence programmes. In such programmes, appraisals have been made in a more open-ended way (Leitenberg, 2002) .
Others have derided assessment procedures that attempt to set out clear demarcations. Novick & Schulman (1990) argue that attempts by military establishments to find vaccines are generally of questionable value, because there is little prospect that they will work effectively when a determined attack takes place (see also Cole, 1997: chapter 10) . Here, military vaccine research serves more or less as a 'cover' for activities that can easily be turned to purposes other than those permitted under the BTWC. Others concur with this assessment, further suggesting that attempts to identify prohibited bioweapons development on the basis of considerations about the quantity of materials stored is unrealistic because of the potential speed with which the organisms reproduce (King & Strauss, 1990) .
Attempts to offer sweeping approval (for example, Huxsoll, 1992) or dismissal (for example, Novick & Schulman, 1990 ) of whole areas of biodefence, on the basis of the characteristics of the activities undertaken, have not predominated in the official implementation of the BTWC. For the reasons I have just mentioned, specification and evaluation of R&D activities can be quite problematic. Despite such difficulty, some basis for assessment has been sought. Leitenberg (2002) argues that the allowance of 'prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes' opens up a category that is just too abstract to function as a basis for determining the acceptability of specific projects. Almost any activity can be justified as contributing to defence at some level. From this he concludes that it is impossible to say when considering individual activities in isolation whether they are intended to serve biological warfare. Instead, the wider 'context' in which individual R&D activities take place must be considered, in order to give them meaning and purpose. Following Leitenberg's argument, Piller & Yamamoto (1988) conducted a review of unclassified information on the US biological defence research programme in the 1980s. In doing so, they acknowledged that research activities could be interpreted in multiple ways. So, while projects taken individually might not indicate inappropriate offensive ends -for example, a project to make Escherichia coli attack human cells -when taken together with other projects -say, an effort to modify the bacterial pathology -a much different picture emerges. Piller and Yamamoto stressed this indeterminacy, as well as concerns about funding patterns and transparency measures, and concluded that the US biodefence programme was ambiguous at best, and strongly suggested inappropriate offensive goals. The fact that US administrations in the 1980s took a confrontational stance in international affairs made the biodefence work appear provocative as well. Wright & Ketcham (1990) likewise treated the problem of interpreting R&D as a matter of contextualization, but they defined the relevant context as the range of known programme activities undertaken by the USA. Efforts to recognize the 'ultimate' goals of biodefence were politically and legally charged. Wright & Ketcham (1990: 191) aimed to avoid 'an indefinite suspension of judgment on the significance of ambiguous research'. They stressed the need to examine 'the pattern of support for the program as a whole and to ask to what extent this pattern indicates interest in either defensive or offensive goals'. However, they went on to assess the merits of particular types of activities. For example, efforts to develop vaccines and even diagnostics are treated as inherently more offensive than defensive, because of the limited effectiveness of such measures. Detection and decontamination activities are more easily classed as defensive, but such activities constituted only a limited part of the US effort. In the end, Wright & Ketcham (1990: 191) conclude that the US programme 'has rapidly expanded since 1980, particularly in the use of new biotechnology; it remains partially secret, classifying policy documents and research results; and it indicates repeated military interest in exploring dimensions of biotechnology that an outside observer could reasonably construe as having potential for offensive application'.
At stake in such debates about the permissibility of 'prophylactic and protective purposes' activities are questions about how the purposes of acts and technologies can be discerned; whether such purposes derive from the characteristics of the individual things under question or whether they only become evident in some wider context. The first approach offers a more straightforward way to appraise acts and technologies, but is open to doubt regarding its adequacy across situations, while the second is more open to diverse considerations, but is more complex and less determinate. As such, the legitimacy of appraisals is open to question.
Disagreements and Dilemmas
The previous section discussed numerous attempts to specify acceptable practice in prohibition regimes. Diametrically opposed views were offered about the merits and significance of actions. Even when there was general agreement about the relevant issues, disagreement could arise over the practicality of specific actions (for example, the feasibility of firing kinetic energy weapons in the way prescribed), the inevitability of certain decisions (for example, because of contractual obligations), the context for evaluation (which kinds of conflict may serve as bases for comparison) and the degree of discontinuity between present and past actions (which informs what counts as a baseline for comparison). As such, attempts to establish prohibitions against specific weapons suffer from many of the same problems afflicting applications of rules in other areas of governance: decisions must be made about when rules should be applied or stop being applied; a given set of rules requires rules about how they ought to be implemented; and the practical application of rules depends on prior understandings that may or may not be shared (Heritage, 1984) . Attempts to derive and implement prohibitions require cutting up complex socio-technical assemblages to suggest just how 'the problem' ought to be conceived. The particular bases for determining acceptability are often countered with suggestions to the effect that implicit within the situation are other concerns that make general determinations problematic (for example, effects-related controls depend on use-related presumptions). In such contentious situations, shared assessments of acceptability should be seen as practical accomplishments rather than conclusions derived from logical necessity.
More than just indicating numerous grounds for disagreement about weaponry, the cases described earlier illustrate the dilemmas attending acceptability assessments. Debates delve into contrary ways to make sense of the issues at stake. Many international negotiations about prohibitions for weapons such as submarines, airplanes or biological weapons have been characterized by diametrically opposed claims about the moral status of technologies. Simply put, such debates often consist of opposing arguments about restrictions on methods of warfare: arguments that such methods will reduce suffering by eliminating the worst extremes of conflict and that restrictions will inadvertently extend the period of combat (thereby increasing suffering) by making the means for resolving it less decisive (Harper, 2001) . For those holding the latter view, if war is nasty and brutish, then it should be as short as possible (Balmer, 2001; Jenkins, 2002) .
These dilemmas can be further illustrated with the UK's HUD export decision. Critics of approval put forward a contrary interpretation of the low-value contributions of the HUD to the F-16s: claiming it reflected how easily (read: cheaply) the government was willing to go back on its stated principles. The insignificance of the component was no reason for diminishing concern, but signified the gravity of the approval. This example resonates with another case in Israel. When four Israeli soldiers living in West Bank settlements were arrested for supplying ammunition to Palestinian militants, a Jewish settler injured in an attack by militants commented: 'To think -there were the terrorists in front of me, firing away . . . and one of our own might have supplied them with the bullets . . .. [The Israeli men] sold us for half a shekel [about 10 cents], the price of one bullet that ruined my life' (BBC News, 2002a) . In this case, the insignificant value of the 'component' in question provides no defence against condemnation.
Barring a pacifist rejection of the importance of the issue, there is no straightforward rationale for establishing which weapons might be more or less acceptable. What makes killing and maiming by one method any worse than another? Why should chemical weapons be labelled as abhorrent 'weapons of mass destruction' when conventional explosives under certain conditions may cause much greater harm? At a basic level, is not there something slightly perverse about analyses that try to establish which means of killing are more acceptable than others?
To say that debates about controls are dilemmatic implies that there are contrary and competing ways to make sense of the issues. But it also can mean more than that. As Billig (1996) and Billig et al. (1989) have elaborated, stances taken on dilemmatic issues can contain the seeds of counter arguments. Vigorous and competing attempts to establish controls on the basis of either a weapon's capabilities or its uses are not exclusive of one another. Rather, competing individual bases can ultimately entail one another. For instance, the ICRC's criteria for defining weapons that inflict superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering rely on assessments of the foreseeable consequences of weapons to disfigure or maim, determinations which require assumptions about how users act in given situations (for example, the extent to which they deliberately breach rules). It seems unlikely that many of those who campaigned for a total ban on antipersonnel landmines would maintain that any and every use of such weapons results in indiscriminate injury; rather, they would argue that past experience of the way mines were handled makes a complete ban necessary to ensure sufficiently rigorous controls are in place. Alternatively, few of those advocating restrictions would admit that controls should be determined irrespective of the type of technology in question (for example, tanks versus nuclear weapons). This mutual entailment becomes stark and highly consequential with suggestions that specific changes to the technology, and to its community of users and how they use it, should alter evaluations of the appropriateness of controls.
Dimensions of Dispute
The previous section argued that opposing accounts are given on the acceptability of weaponry. The opposing accounts offer competing assessments of prohibition regimes, depending on whether a weapon, its users or some other factor is treated as the principal determinant. Contention often centres on the nature of categories and the things to be categorized. This paper has suggested that efforts to establish criteria for gauging the acceptability of weapons-related activities are open for unpacking. This is not to say that characteristics of weapons as silent, deadly, indiscriminate, unknown, severe or any other quality are not prominent in, or even central to, arms control discussions. Just which criteria are deemed important in which situations, and just what they mean in relation to specific prohibition regimes, are negotiated matters. Here as elsewhere, the implementation of criteria depends upon local interpretative work (Heritage, These comments are not meant to suggest that any attempt to prohibit specific weapons will be misguided, counter-productive or summarily rejected. They do imply, though, that any such effort depends on mobilizing a particular understanding of the capacities of technology, the situational context, the identity of the users, the ends served and other considerations. As suggested earlier, disputes about these issues have been quite widespread in many arms-control discussions.
This section seeks to clarify some of the key problems that thwart attempts to establish workable and legitimate standards for determining the acceptability of weapons-related activities. A substantial range of issues can be included in such an analysis. As argued earlier, three inter-related considerations are central to dilemmas associated with the acceptability of weapons: how technology is understood in relation to its context; how acts and technologies are categorized; and how the desire to make relevant statements is balanced against the need to respond to specific instances. The next section elaborates the strategies through which actors attempt to respond to these persistent problems.
What and Where is the Problem? Technology and Context
Not surprisingly in deliberations about the acceptability of force options, the status of technology is a major topic of contention. While there may be agreement at times about what counts as a credible characterization of what technology does, is, and is for, such agreement often is unstable. A general orientation to technology as contingent, negotiated and problematic -in other words an orientation akin to that of constructivist STS -is abundantly evident in arms negotiations. The twists and turns associated with the cases discussed earlier would suggest an effort to understand how determinations of acceptability are made requires an approach flexible enough to follow the machinations (or nuances) in discussions about the relative appropriateness of inflicting death and injury.
'Context' is a multi-faceted concept that is made to do a great deal of work in specifying the relevant factors influencing appraisals. As noted earlier, in the case of the SIrUS project, definitions of context other than those presumed were used to criticize the standards of acceptability offered. Just how much the employment of weaponry should be abstracted from its context for purposes of making general claims about its 'effects' is a matter that often engenders considerable debate. Yet the need for abstraction in the course of establishing prohibitions is apparent.
The issues at stake in debates about context range widely; more so than just saying that certain weapons are only considered acceptable in specific situations, or that appraisals must take technology 'in context'. To start with, definitions of context partly constitute the acceptability of actions, the necessary response measures, and the capabilities attributed to weapons. In the case of the UK government's approval of the HUD to Israel, in the context of the increasingly global production of defence components, Britain was said to be forced to reconsider its export policy in order to accommodate to 'the new modern reality'. In this case, the export application for the HUD was compared to other types of export decisions, so that exception could be made for the category of component parts.
Alternative portrayals of context provide the basis for different appraisals of action. For example, the history of export licence decisions by the British Labour government was characterized in this paper as involving a series of questionable transfer decisions made under a fog of governmental discretion. This characterization suggests an alternative way to understand the HUD policy than was given in government announcements at the time. Rather than being a radical break, as some critics argued, with the essence of past policies, or, as government officials maintained, a mere redrawing of existing boundaries the account in this paper suggests that the policy represents a continuation of past decision-making procedures.
The HUD example also highlights how accounts of context provide a causal background for attributing responsibility. When death or injury results from the use of force, questions are often asked about why: whether the individuals involved were really responsible or whether situational features were more relevant. What is at stake is the attribution of blame (McGill, 1997) . In the instance of Palestinian fatalities from rubber bullets, IDF spokespersons suggested that various event-specific factors led to the deaths: the soldier's aim erred slightly, because of the confusion of the situation; or a child appeared suddenly in the line of fire. Since such matters can be unavoidable in street conflicts, citing them can minimize condemnation. Rather than focusing on the particularities of events in context, critics of the IDF contrast it to other security forces and point to the failure of leadership to monitor soldiers' action, prosecute their wrongdoings or furnish them with less lethal munitions. Responsibility rests with leaders of the defence force who were entrusted to act appropriately. Which account holds sway is crucial, as those 'who are most effective in establishing causal background may be able to control public assessment of blame' (McGill, 1997: 240) .
Rather than just treating context as a flexible resource for making arguments about acceptability or allocating blame, following a suggestion by Grint & Woolgar (1997) 5 in these cases it is possible to treat 'context' and 'technology' as being mutually defined. Moreover, notions of identity are reciprocally constituted in relation to technology and context. Implicitly or explicitly, many analysts of 'biodefence' projects have suggested that their status can be properly determined only by situating them within the wider programme in which they were undertaken. Depending on assessments of the wider programme's purpose, individual activities -such as the production of aerosolization testing devices -take on wholly different meanings. There is a process at work in which presumptions about the overall intent of actions inform characterizations about specific activities.
Such characterizations, in turn, are used to inform determinations of intent. Many critics of the US 'biodefence' programme treated the secrecy surrounding it and the wider political posturing of US administrations as indicators of the dubious intent of the undertaking. Seemingly acceptable individual projects were re-considered for how they might inform offensive weapons development. In turn, the number and character of such ambiguous activities provided justification for concerns about the ultimate aims served by the programme as a whole. Although circular, such reasoning is central to how determinations are made about unacceptably offensive programmes. Instead of treating such iterative processes as misguided, we can understand them as part and parcel of how meaning is attributed to activities and artefacts.
In sum, the inter-relation and co-definition of technology and context are chronic sources of difficulty and controversy for attempts by arms control regimes to separate technical from contextual matters.
What is Like What? Categorizations
A recurrent difficulty for establishing definitive characterizations of the acceptability of acts and technologies -which, in turn, provide a basis for setting prohibitions -has to do with their credibility. If the world is not to be understood as an assortment of unique objects or instances of force, then objects must be clustered together. Problems arise both in terms of which contexts and devices ought to be placed under the same category and how such categorizations should be evaluated. Relations of identity must be argued for: just what is like what -what is considered sufficiently 'the same' as something else for the practical purposes sought. Much can hinge on judgements about just which weapons (or weapon components) merit special treatment or which activities count as instances of prohibited actions.
The importance of categorizations and particularizations for advancing arguments is hardly unique to deliberations about weapons. Billig (1996) has given a highly insightful analysis of the importance of such forms of reasoning. So while many social psychologists and others have sought to derive general laws for predicting behaviour and attitudes, such efforts have been continually frustrated by contextual interactions that do not conform to such laws. When qualifications are made, the exceptional cases become topics for deriving general laws that explain them, which leads to further exceptions being found, and so on. The result is a never-ending process of argumentation that moves between generalities and particularizations in a manner that frustrates efforts to derive simple rules for explaining behaviour. In this sense, categorization and particularization are inextricably bound together. An important point following from Billig's work is that expert analysis alone cannot authoritatively determine onceand-for-all which characteristics of the object or action should serve as an essential basis for categorization. In principle, it is always possible to suggest an alternative basis for considering similarities and differences by Billig's analysis is highly salient for the debates discussed in this paper. At stake in weapons evaluations is the extent to which contexts and devices are treated as equivalent or different. In the case of the biological weapons, the alternative to the categorization of certain R&D activities as acceptable biodefence measures was that they were actually instances of inappropriate offensive efforts. Debate has taken also place about which policy should be understood as an exception to a given practice and which represents a more fundamental change. In the example of the British approval for the HUD, much of the attention centred on whether this decision represented a mere re-drafting of rules in light of specific concerns over the growing importance of incorporated parts (in other words a particularization) or whether it signalled that the Labour government had forgone its ethical stance regarding arms (in other words a new categorization was required). In appraisals of 'what is going on' in any situation, categorizations can be opposed by particularizations and particularizations by categorizations.
So What? The General and the Specific
Closely related to how technologies and contexts are defined and how categorizations and particularizations are offered is the matter of generality. There is a basic problem in offering evaluations that can justify a particular regime of arms control: general claims must be responsive to specific incidents. Attempts to establish general proscriptions on actions or weapons can be countered by pointing out the diversity of the things under discussion. Broad prohibitions (for example, a ban on all anti-personal landmines) can be countered by pointing to specific incidents in which using the technology did not result in deleterious outcomes (for examples, 'smart' 'non-lethal' or self-deactivating anti-personnel mines used as tactical protection aids). When only a narrowly defined set of contexts or technologies is within the remit of specific prohibitions, it can be said that nothing of much general applicability is being offered. Prohibitions limited to highly specific uses of weapons are often deemed ineffective, irrelevant or unworkable, and therefore given low priority in international negotiations. In addition to treating it as a topic, the argument in this paper has exemplified the various tensions associated with seeking both generality and specificity. The need to offer claims of general relevance and the problems of doing so are pervasive in analyses that purport to provide authoritative accounts of the world.
Tensions associated with reconciling the general and the specific are implicated in categorizations. So, the attempts of the ICRC to define the category of inhumane weapons by deriving general criteria for what constitutes superfluous injury have been countered with arguments that identify specific situations in which those weapons may be less harmful than other options. Following Billig, arguments for making exceptions to such general criteria by stressing particular situations can set up new general categorizations, which, in turn, can be challenged by marshalling further particulars, and so on.
Managing the Unmanageable
Thus far, I have argued that attempts to offer persuasive arguments about the acceptability of weaponry face persistent challenges. Accounts of which prohibitions are necessary must find credible ways of reconciling or at least managing dilemmas associated with specifying the acceptability of the employment of weaponry. While the destruction wrought by weaponry might only be properly understood in terms of the operation of complex socio-technical assemblages in particular contexts, prohibitions often seek to disentangle the assemblages. The basis for including certain objects and acts in one category rather than another can become open to question, but categorizations are sought nonetheless. With generality in prohibitions comes ambiguity, but with specificity comes inconsequentiality.
As suggested earlier, parties engaged in weapon-control negotiations are highly adept in adopting alternative lines of argumentation that challenge attempts to provide definitive appraisals. Not only can the individual elements of pairings such as technology-context, general-specific and categories-particulars be played off against one another, but each of these pairings can be used to undermine another. That might mean challenging generalizations about technology by offering alternative categorizations; or a categorization can be questioned by proposing an alternative contextualization; and so on. So, for instance, an ability to advance general claims about a category of technology is necessary for securing agreement with and adherence to prohibitions on anti-personnel landmines. Even if an agreement seems to have been reached about landmines, whether or not certain technologies fall under this anti-personnel category continues to be a topic of heated debate (German Initiative to Ban Landmines & Landmine Action, 2001 ). The perennial and perhaps ineradicable difficulties have no in principle final resolution; they involve the ethical and intellectual problems of naming and classifying phenomena to impose order on the world (Bauman, 1991) .
In this paper, I aim to say more than that debates about the acceptability of the employment of weapons are characterized by claims and counter claims that shift around in a troubled manner between the general and the particular, categorizations and particularizations, and technology and context. Seemingly intractable problems are associated with determining how a technology should be understood in context, how categorizations should be made of acts and technologies, and how statements of general relevance can be responsive to specific occasions. Interestingly, however, these difficulties have not resulted in paralysis. Rather, actors engage in various strategies to 'get along'. The remainder of this paper considers some strategies for doing this.
Elsewhere, I elaborated upon one such strategy for reconciling the general and the specific (Rappert, 2001 ). I did so by following Lee's (1999) work on institutional legitimacy and Grint & Woolgar's (1997) post-essentialist theory of technology. In that case, I described how UK police forces managed the indeterminacies, uncertainties and contestations associated with formulating guidelines for the use of force. Police policymakers faced demands to devise legitimate rules that both facilitated officer discretion in the use of force (so as to maintain flexibility) and imposed definite limitations on the range of action (so as to convince sceptics that strict controls were in place). The aim to devise general policies for chemical incapacitant sprays responsive to specific situations led to the organizational and temporal deferral of the resolution of indeterminacies and dilemmas. These deferred indeterminacies and dilemmas were passed down the organizational hierarchy to street-level officers. The general policy was that individual officers should decide upon and justify the appropriateness of resorting to the sprays on a case-by-case basis. This process of deferral was part of constituting an understanding of the risks associated with the technology and the identity of its users. In this case, the contingent framing of the debate implicated discussions about the merits of the deployment of the sprays centred on the intent and competence of street officers. One of the main implications of this analysis was that, rather than suggesting that analysts of technology strive to offer supposedly authoritative readings of the capabilities of technology, it was prudent to examine how the 'ambiguities' associated with them were distributed organizationally, where they were 'resolved' and by whom.
Temporal and intra-organizational deferral is just one among many strategies for managing the dilemmas associated with giving policies and prohibitions a degree of legitimacy. Here I want to propose the notion of 'disposal strategies' as a useful way to conceive of the various ways of specifying phenomena. 'Disposal' is a useful guiding concept in a number of ways. First, if there is no final, definitive, in principle resolution to the dilemmas outlined, then a key question is how actors 'rid themselves' (or attempt to rid themselves) of the need for resolution. Second, 'disposal' also points to the active ordering, adjustment, bestowing, attributing and regulating that takes place in accounts. Each of the partial and provisional 'resolutions' considered later is inextricably bound up with determinations of who or what is the determinant of causality, the bearer of responsibility or the source of blame. Third, the accounts are meant to persuade (or dispose) others to accept certain ways of seeing what needs to be done. Finally, the strategies are offered as contingent resources, in relation to specific, local occasions, and thus are themselves occasioned, and even disposable.
One of the bluntest disposal strategies for 'coping' with the interrelation and mutual definition of technology-context, general-specific and
234
Social Studies of Science 35/2 categories-particulars is simply to deny their relevancy. Calls for outright bans on certain weapons are often based on general, wide ranging and absolute categories and principles that give no heed to context, that make no allowance for weapons in specific situations and that give little indication of the potential for negotiation. In short, denial simply asserts or implies that there are no difficulties to be resolved. In 2003, for instance, the NGO Amnesty International adopted the position that it 'opposes the use, possession, production and transfer of nuclear weapons, given their indiscriminate nature'. As suggested earlier, sweeping claims are often challenged. Prohibitions establishing outright bans are rarely agreed upon, and in practice the import of such prohibitions is always open to question.
In the ICRC SIrUS Project, generalized use-independent criteria were specified for determining which conventional weapons cause unnecessary suffering. Possible contingencies associated with weapons were suppressed in favour of objective guidelines. Fault for causing unnecessary suffering then rests with designers and weapon procurers who turn a blind eye to the consequences of their actions. The ability to exorcise classification schemes from the complexities associated with varied employments of weaponry is said to derive from objective calculations made by medical professionals to determine what counts as superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. In this sense, for all practical purposes the criteria deny certain contingencies by deference to medical expertise. So, rather than voicing a 'public conscience' or allowing political deliberation to provide the basis for standards of unnecessary suffering, the ICRC proposes medical expertise alone to be sufficient. In contrast, critics challenge these criteria by drawing attention to contextual considerations or to specific types of technology that don't fit them. While medical experts, such as those associated with the ICRC, may provide some cachet of credibility, they have proven insufficient to fend off criticism.
In many respects, the British government policy covering applications for component parts is based on deferral: displacing the task of specifying just what is and is not acceptable. While the 'incorporation component' policy articulated by Jack Straw ostensibly sets out criteria to guide export decisions, just what the criteria mean and when they should be applied are determined on case-by-case basis depending on the definition given to the situation and the technology in question. Government officials privately consulting one another decide which export applications fall under the heading of 'incorporation component', what constitutes an extenuating circumstance in relation to one or another understanding of the context, and how general rules should be applied in specific situations. While the discretionary policy is highly flexible, it is also supposed to be constrained by an ethical principle not to sell equipment likely to be used for internal repression. As detailed earlier, though, the potential for drawing on a wide range of factors to sideline relevant ethical principles is more than a mere possibility.
In the case of the HUD, debates about their acceptability took either a major or a minor shift (depending on one's categorizations of past practices) on 22 July 2002, when an F-16 jet dropped a 1-ton guided bomb on an apartment complex in which the Palestinian Sheikh Salah Shahada was hiding, killing 14 civilians. Widespread international condemnation of the bombing gave the Foreign Office reason to reconsider the transfer of F-16 components to Israel. Government officials assured apprehensive parties that the existing rules would be more strictly implemented in the future (BBC News, 2002b) . Just what counts as a 'strict' interpretation of the rules remains to be established in future decisions.
In important respects the 'fog of uncertainty' attributed to export decisions functions to deter challenges to the legitimacy of how general rules are applied to specific situations, how categorizations are made of component parts and how the context of the new 'modern reality' is drawn upon for making decisions about weapons applications. While this might limit the amount of contention by making it difficult for would-be critics to substantiate arguments to the effect that the government went against its stated principles when making particular export decisions, it also leads people to question whether any ethical grounding existed in the first place.
And yet, to argue that such a 'fog' exists is a highly performative line of argument. According to my characterizations of the controversial decisions about bioweapons R&D and the HUD transfer, in both the enclosure of information makes it difficult to assess government policies. To maintain this deflects responsibility away from me as an analyst to further consider if there might be consistent ways in which general principles were applied in making the decisions. Nothing more needs to be said because nothing more can be said. Yet, government officials have argued that consistent logics of application exist if only one considers the decisions in their wider context. Instead of agreeing with this position, this analysis has suggested that the failures by government officials to give adequate explanation of their decisions means responsibility lies with the very officials themselves who are able, but unwilling, to act with transparency.
In debates about the acceptability of landmines, the negotiations over which prescriptions are viable can be viewed as attempts to deflect responsibility for enforcing whether general principles are followed in specific cases. So, officials who suggested that the various qualifications associated with the United Nations Certain Conventional Weapons Convention were unenforceable, were able to deflect from themselves the task of trying to substantiate violations. They did so by agreeing to the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention that banned the category of anti-personnel mines altogether. In this Convention, matters of intent, purpose or competence have no place.
Reconciliation strategies that link generalizations with particularizations do not result in a single way to make sense of, let alone to control, landmines. For instance, the APM Convention has not resolved disputes about what constitutes an unacceptable 'mine'. Instead, efforts to treat a 
Conclusion
The use of force is often hotly contested. Multiple and competing descriptions are routinely given of particular acts so as to support alternative evaluations. This paper has sought to develop a greater appreciation of the epistemic and ethical issues at stake in attempts to establish formal limits to the acceptability of weaponry. Such efforts are bedevilled by problems of specifying just what takes place, why, and how it should be evaluated. Prohibitions establish notions of acceptability by alternatively drawing exact lines that attempt to lay out standards, proposing that judgements can only be made on an ad hoc basis with all-things-considered, or seeking some sort of middle ground that specifies relevant considerations without setting out what they mean. In addition, prohibitions variably apply to users, purposes or technologies as the principal sources of concern. Whatever approach is adopted, justifying prohibition regimes requires cutting through a heterogeneous world in order to offer a characterization of just what is taking place and why. How definitions of the effects of technologies, the identity of users, or the contexts of use are interpreted and sustained through this cutting up process are key concerns. I have contended that, while actors and analysts alike recognize many of the problems and dilemmas entailed, claims are offered nonetheless. Attempts to offer prohibitions involve managing pervasive dilemmas associated with efforts to make specific situations responsive to general claims, to split technology from context, and to offer convincing categorizations. As a result, arms-control agreements that set out ethical standards for force are potentially contestable. While they may not always be challenged in practice, specifications of just what is at stake and what is taking place are characterized by a persistent fragility.
This paper elaborated some of the strategies through which actors manage tensions associated with making arms-control determinations. It argued that when faced with fundamental difficulties and dilemmas associated with offering legitimate determinations of the acceptability of the use of weaponry, actors (and analysts) engage in various strategies to deny, defer, deter and deflect having to resolve the difficult issues involved. The manner in which this is done helps to constitute a sense of where responsibility should rest for handling the tension-ridden issues associated with determining acceptability. In this sense, and following constructivist lines of research in sociology and international relations (see, for example, Rappert: Prohibitions, Weapons and Controversy 237 Katzenstein, 1996) , these strategies can be said to co-produce both identity and technology. The notion of 'disposal strategies' was offered as a characterization of techniques for managing the persistent, and perhaps irresolvable, difficulties associated with determining the acceptability of weaponry. This concept usefully complements others in STS that address the continuing legitimacy problems faced by efforts to account for scientific and technical activities. Gieryn (1999) , for instance, and others have offered the concept of 'boundary work' as a way of characterizing attempts to define and maintain distinctions between fact/value, science/pseudo-science, expert/ lay and natural/social. Control over these distinctions is essential for offsetting up the authority to speak on the issues in dispute. In this paper, however, the focus was on the establishment of boundaries in contested terrain, as much as it was about the directed movement, or displacement, of contested problems. The management and distribution of dilemmas are central to shoring up perceptions of the legitimacy of rules restricting technology, as well as constituting an understanding of what technology is, what it is for, and what it does. With the ever partial, inadequate and fleeting status of attempts to give order to the world, analysts can gain much by attending to the performative aspects of such efforts.
